The Silent Revolution in Anti?Poverty Programmes: Minimum Income Guarantees in Brazil by Houtzager, Peter P.
1 Introduction
Municipal and federal governments in Brazil have
created a series of minimum income guarantee
programmes that aim to tackle intergenerational
poverty, on a large scale and within a rights
framework. These programmes represent a silent
revolution in the form and size of government anti-
poverty intervention. In little more than a decade,
income guarantee programmes have become the
country’s principal anti-poverty strategy, dwarfing
the patchwork of charitable or non-profit
organisations that have, with public funding,
historically sought to meet the needs of the poor. In
the city of São Paulo, the Minimum Family-Income
Guarantee Programme, henceforth Renda Mínima,
provides monthly income grants to almost 150,000
families living in extreme poverty, or around
600,000 people.1 Building on such municipal
initiatives, the federal government’s Bolsa Família
(Family Grant) offers similar grants to an
unprecedented 11.2 million families, an estimated
third of the country’s population.
The silence of the country’s numerous movements
and organisations that work with and represent
people living in poverty in the processes that
produced this shift is, to say the least, puzzling. Why
have rural and urban movements, neighbourhood
and community associations in poor urban areas,
organisations of the social workers and psychologists
who work with the poor, churches, and non-profit
service providers not had a significant participation in
the design, implementation, and social control of
programmes that directly effect the populations with
which they work? If these actors have been silent,
then who has spoken for the poor and contributed
to establishing the new programmes? 
The answers to these questions are important in
their own right and critical to understanding the
ability of actors representing the poor to negotiate
policy and engage in the social accountability of
minimum income guarantee programmes over the
medium to long term.2
This article offers preliminary answers, examining the
trajectory of São Paulo’s Renda Mínima. The
programme is the largest of the municipal minimum
family income guarantee programmes and the
immediate precursor to Bolsa Família.3 It is
particularly interesting because (1) it represents an
unambiguous ‘rights-based approach’ to poverty
reduction, and therefore contrasts with the
conditional cash transfer programmes more common
outside of Brazil, and (2) São Paulo is home to a
densely networked civil society, including to parts of
the Movement for the Unified Social Assistance
System (Sistema Único de Assistencia Social, SUAS).
The pro-SUAS movement is at the centre of the
other major shift in anti-poverty programmes, the
‘noisy’ and piecemeal reforms to establish a single,
national and public social assistance system.
The evidence from ongoing fieldwork in São Paulo
strongly suggests that the silence surrounding Renda
Mínima was manufactured and not a historical
accident. Elected city administrations have
manufactured this silence to enhance their own
autonomy and to establish a direct (unmediated)
relation between the state and beneficiaries. It has
been political leaders who, responding at least in
part to the electoral cycle, have been central to the
development of Renda Mínima. 
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2 A rights-based anti-poverty strategy 
Renda Mínima was created in 2001, the city’s first
large-scale anti-poverty programme for people
outside of the formal labour market. Within a year,
the programme bypassed all other social assistance
programmes combined in the size of the population
served and in budget share. By the end of 2008, São
Paulo’s administration expects the programme to
reach over 200,000 of the 300,000 families that fall
below the poverty line, i.e. 12 per cent of the city’s
10.4 million people.4 The programme’s budget in
2006, R$168.9 million (¤62.5 million), represented
88 per cent of the budget of the Municipal
Secretariat for Social Assistance and Development
(SMADS). The remaining 12 per cent covers the
SUAS-related social assistance programmes financed
by the municipal government and administrative
costs (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2007). 
Families with children under the age of 16, and a per
capita income of less than R$175,5 are entitled to a
monthly income grant under the programme.6 The
family must have resided in the city for two years and
prove legal custody of the children. The monthly
grant is R$140, R$170 or R$200 (¤52, ¤63 or ¤74)
depending on whether a family has one, two, or
more than two children respectively. Any other
income transfers, such as those from the federal
Bolsa Escola, are subtracted from the benefit. The
average benefit in 2006 was R$117 (¤41) (SMADS
2007: 50). Renda Mínima requires that the families
fulfil a corresponding obligation: ensure all school-
age children attend at least 85 per cent of their
classes and that children under the age of six
complete the government’s vaccination schedule.
Families register directly with the government and
then access their monthly grant through a bank
account opened in their name, normally using a bank
card.
Families in the programme are the extremely poor,
with an average monthly household income of only
R$243.76 (roughly ¤101.57 at 2001 exchange rate).
The average family size is 4.3 persons (with 2.2
children). Half the families had two parents, but the
entitlement holders were overwhelmingly women
(74.2 per cent). There is no legal requirement that
women in the household must be the entitlement
holder but women tend to have legal custody of the
children and are generally responsible for the
education and health of family members (see
MacPherson, this IDS Bulletin).
2.1 Legal entitlement or conditional cash transfer?
Renda Mínima is seen by its proponents and the
municipal administrators as a right and as rights
enhancing. It seeks to provide income support to
poor families that will enable them to keep their
children in school and to access an array of public
services that make possible the realisation of other
rights. In the international debate on poverty
reduction, Brazil’s income guarantee programmes
like Renda Mínima are seen as exemplary conditional
cash transfer programmes (CCTs). The difference
between ‘guaranteed incomes’ and ‘conditional cash’
is more than semantic, however, and
notwithstanding similar transfer mechanisms, the
programmes’ contrasting labels reflects different
approaches to achieving the goal of reducing
intergenerational poverty.
The rights language behind guaranteeing a minimum
income suggests its legal status as an entitlement
and defines the recipient’s relation to the state as
that of a citizen. Conversely, the programme
represents a collective obligation of society (met
through the state) to its poorer citizens. The income
grants are a redistribution of income. For many of
the proponents of minimum income guarantees such
as Renda Mínima or Bolsa Família, these are a step
towards a universal basic or citizen income (Suplicy
and Buarque 1997; Suplicy 2007; Sposati 1997),
legislation for which was passed by Congress in 2004
(Law 10,835/2004).7 Not surprisingly then,
completing children’s vaccination schedules and
keeping them in school is called a contrapartida – a
corresponding obligation – rather than a
‘conditionality.’ Even the design of the programme is
defended on the basis that it enhances families’
autonomy and citizenship: the direct relation
established between family and the state is meant to
exclude the intermediation of civil society
organisations, which have historically been subject to
clientelism and patronage. 
The city administration that established Renda Mínima
emphasised that the programme was enacted by
municipal law (Law 12,651 and subsequent revisions) and
creates a state obligation (Pochmann 2002). It is not a
discretionary programme that administrations can
choose to implement or not. Its budget comes from an
earmark of 5 per cent of the municipal budget for
ensuring the realisation of the right to education
established in the city’s Lei Organica, the city charter
(Article 208). Failure of the city administration to make
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sufficient progress in implementing the programme
can be challenged in court. It is less clear whether,
under existing legislation and jurisprudence, families can
use the courts to secure their entitlement, as
implementation of the programme is ‘gradual,
observing the financial resources’ of the municipality
(Law 12,831 revised by Law 13,164). 
The proponents of conditional cash transfers have
not given attention to the legal basis of the transfer,
or its role enhancing people’s relation to the state,
but rather they emphasise the government’s
discretion over concession of the benefit, the
conditional and temporary nature of the benefit, and
families’ relations to the market. The programmes
may or may not be enacted through legislation. Most
of the international debate of these programmes
focuses on important gains in efficiency, relative to
conventional social assistance programmes to meet
the needs of the poor, the precision of targeting,
and the development of human capital through both
children’s education and socioeducational activities
for adults. Conditionality, in these demand-side
interventions, are meant to ensure that the poor
transform their behaviour in ways that lead to the
accumulation of human capital (Brière and Rawlings
2006; Rawlings and Rubio 2003; World Bank 2005).
In contrast to income guarantee programmes, for
which achieving full coverage is a critical concern,
CCTs have a greater preoccupation with the
investment in developing human capital through a
range of support services and programmes. 
3 Manufacturing silence 
Civil society actors’ silence in the short trajectory of
São Paulo’s minimum income guarantee programme,
from initial discussions in the early 1990s to
implementation in 2001, is not a historical accident
but one manufactured over time. The Workers’ Party
(PT) administration (2001–4) that created Renda
Mínima in São Paulo developed a modus operandi in
the programme’s foundational year that minimised
the role organisations representing poor
communities could play in policymaking and even in
social accountability. Important parts of this modus
operandi have been carried over into the subsequent
administration, by the opposition alliance of the
Social Democratic Party of Brazil (PSDB) and
Democrats (DEM) (2005–9). 
The investment of the PT administration in
manufacturing this silence, and thereby enhancing its
own autonomy, has two sources that reflect some of
the challenges faced by rights-based anti-poverty
strategies. The first source was a commitment to
government implementation, rather than by civil
society organisations that mediate the relationship
between the state and the poor. The administration
explicitly juxtaposed its approach to combating social
exclusion and poverty to the longstanding social
assistance model: small-scale projects that seek to
meet the immediate needs of a particular vulnerable
population segment, and are executed by non-profit
organisations that are perceived as paternalistic and
vulnerable to forms of clientelism (Pochmann 2002,
2004). In the process of building direct relations
between the state and beneficiaries, to strengthen
this citizenship relation, the administration also
closed the door to organised groups that might have
a legitimate role in negotiating policy and in ensuring
some form of social accountability. 
The second source is the electoral cycle. The challenge
facing any elected official is selecting programmes that
can, within a two-year period, produce visible and
significant benefits to large segments of the
population. This is particularly true if the programmes
involved do not enjoy the support of a large organised
political base. Elections for executive positions are held
every four years in Brazil, but the first year of any
administration is largely spent on setting up the
administration and year four on re-election and
touting the results of the administration’s work.
Programme benefits have to be visible and significant
at the beginning of the election campaign. Electoral
pressure therefore means that any new programmes
created by an administration have to begin producing
visible results within the second and third year of the
term. This creates a paradox of sorts for anti-poverty
programmes that aim to break durable,
intergenerational poverty, since the electoral cycle
dictates that significant progress must be made within
a 1–3 year period. 
The interest of the PT administration in limiting the
role of local leaders and their organisations is most
clearly visible in the programme’s foundational
moment – Year One of administration. At the
moment when the institutional location of the
programme was decided and the format of its
implementation finalised, opportunities for local
leaders and organisations representing the poor to
negotiate policy and/or build some form of
institutional access to the administration were
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virtually non-existent. The administration placed
Renda Mínima not in the existing Secretariat for
Social Assistance, which had extensive relations with
social workers and civil organisations that execute its
programmes,8 but in the Finance Secretariat, and
then in a newly created Secretariat of Development,
Work, and Solidarity (Secretaria do Desenvolvimento,
Trabalho, e Solidaridade, SDTS). Senator Eduardo
Suplicy and Mayor Marta Suplicy provided the SDTS
additional political armour against external pressures.
Even the ‘Support and Social Accountability
Commission’, mandated by Renda Mínima legislation
and on which organisations of beneficiaries and
workers in social assistance have representation, was
never made functional.
The manner through which the programme would
be implemented, through intensive registration
campaigns of potential beneficiaries that targeted
specific low-income regions of the city, was
developed entirely within the state apparatus.
Selection of the priority regions was based on a
ranking of the city’s 96 districts according to their
Human Development Index value. Registering
beneficiaries in these areas, and subsequent lower
priority areas, was conducted almost entirely by the
city’s 28 regional administrations with little role for
local organisations. The subsequent administration
would follow the same process, only using a
different index to select regions and subcontracting
the registration process to a public interest NGO.
The restricted interaction with local leaders and
organisations in the city’s low-income areas
established in this foundational period has also
carried over. These interactions took one of two
forms. First, in the areas where the programme
registration or re-registration campaigns are
conducted, government officials hold extensive
meetings with local leaders – political,
neighbourhood, religious, and others – to explain the
programme’s goals, selection criteria and benefit,
and then ask for assistance in informing the public
about the programme. Second, leaders of local
organisations, as well as local politicians, trigger
administrative review procedures when they channel
demands of families or entire neighbourhoods who
believe they ought to have been registered or
selected as beneficiaries, or complaints about bank
cards that fail to work, delays or termination of
grants without notification, and so forth. This type of
pressure on the administration is common and
ongoing. Progressive and conservative Vereadores,
elected members of the city’s legislature, the Câmara
dos Vereadores, play a particularly important role in
triggering administrative review, often at the request
of local association leaders. 
This ability of community or neighbourhood
associations, and especially that of Vereadores, to
trigger forms of administrative review provides an
important form of ad hoc accountability. But other
than creating mechanisms that facilitate
administrative review, the government has sought to
keep these actors at arm’s length. No regional or
municipal networks of organisations have emerged
to engage in more systematic forms of social
accountability, let alone to negotiate public policy.
There are cases of collective demands for expansion
of the programme to new micro-regions of the city,
the most recent of which is the inclusion of two
villages of indigenous peoples in the southern tip of
the city.
With one important exception, the demands on the
city’s administration bypass the existing participatory
governance councils, such as the Municipal Council
for Social Assistance, which is meant to oversee
social assistance programmes (Pólis 2007). 
Demands have been made directly on regional
administrations, the Secretariats, the Mayor, or
indirectly through the mediation of Vereadores. The
exception that proves the rule occurred in the 2003
Participatory Budget, when leaders from the Penha
regional administration, composed of four districts,
succeeded in placing the extension of the STDS
programmes as a priority for the region (Pochmann
2003: 64). This hastened the extension of the Renda
Mínima to that region. The participatory budget was
discontinued by the subsequent PSDB–DEM
administration, however, and the institutional
mechanism is no longer available.
3.1 SUAS movement and a noisy piecemeal reform
Comparing the role civil society organisations have had
in the development of Renda Mínima to that of the
pro-SUAS movement in the emergence of Unified
Social Assistance System (SUAS) puts in relief the lack
of voice of the former. The movement, led by mostly
public sector workers – social workers, psychologists
and professors in social services departments – has
sought to make social assistance a right, anchored in a
social assistance policy that integrates and directs the
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patchwork of civil society organisations engaged in
service delivery into a unified and public system.9 It
emerged in the late 1980s and grew in the 1990s in a
process of intense and ongoing interaction with
various parts of the state. 
Although the SUAS reforms have been piecemeal,
reflecting the scale and complexity of its ambitions
as well as strong opposition from some service
providers, the movement has succeeded in passing
critical enacting legislation and in inserting its
activists and leaders into key government positions. It
has also taken a lead in creating hundreds of
participatory governance institutions all over country,
as well as a variety of civil society forums. In São
Paulo, this institutional ferment has produced
numerous municipal and sub-municipal councils and
forums for social assistance and specific subgroups:
the elderly, children and adolescents, people living on
the street. 
Why has the one block of actors that work with the
poor and has coalesced into a substantial movement
not spoken out on minimum income guarantees?
Fieldwork conducted to date only provides a few
clues. One clue is the deep antagonism members of
this movement have towards proponents of income
guarantees, who come from parts of the left and/or
the discipline of economics, and who are highly
critical of social assistance as a sector. Another clue is
an apparent myopia of the movement, induced by
the nature of the professional training and the
overarching goal of establishing social assistance as a
legitimate public policy field.
There is some awareness within the movement that
the city’s, and the country’s, most significant anti-
poverty initiatives have passed them by, but there are
no creative proposals on the table that would make
possible entering into a coalition around such
programmes. Income guarantee programmes in fact
barely received mention in the 10th Social Assistance
Conference of 2007, considered by some movement
leaders a watershed. 
3.2 Excesses of pluralisation 
The commitment of the PT administration to limiting
the role of civil society actors in Renda Mínima and of
the pro-SUAS movement to a unified and
government-led social assistance system reflect an
important reality of the organisations who work with
and represent the poor. The long-established pattern
of relations between the state and these organisations
has produced an extreme pluralisation and
segmentation, by population, service, and region of
the city, that coordination, or building broad alliances,
in order to engage broader policy issue is extremely
difficult in the absence of significant external
facilitation. Public subsidies, tax exemptions, and
service delivery contracts to civil society organisations
working with small population groups has, since the
1930s, created a large and chaotic universe of actors
whose interests are narrowly constructed around their
particular clientele. These actors have little interest in a
broad entitlement programme, the benefits of which
they cannot allocate. Even urban movements such as
those for housing or gatherers of recycled materials
fall victim to this logic when government accedes to
their demands.
The proliferation of participatory governance
institutions and civil society forums has not
significantly reduced this difficulty. The various
governance councils and civil society forums that are
meant to facilitate coordination, policy discussion,
and social accountability appear, at this point in time,
to reproduce this long-standing pattern of
state–society relations. They are used to negotiate
the terms of government service delivery contracts
and to regulate the organisations that seek to obtain
such contracts. Organisations of the poor (called
‘users’ in the governance council discourse) generally
fail to participate in these institutions, although the
institutional design seeks to include them. There is
some evidence to suggest that whether participatory
governance institutions are available for coordinating
action and engaging in substantive policy discussions,
depends on the political leadership of the city’s
administration.
4 Political leadership and anti-poverty
programmes
Political leaders and electoral cycles do not feature
prominently in international discussions of anti-poverty
programmes, or are seen as obstacles to effective
poverty alleviation. In São Paulo, however, political
leadership and competitive electoral politics
contributed decisively to Renda Mínima. Politicians and
partisan politics are, sometimes with good reason,
blamed for the failure of public policies. One lesson
that can be taken from the case of Renda Mínima is
that political leaders and electoral cycles inevitably play
a central role in the lives of ambitious anti-poverty
programmes, and that this need not be bad. 
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The development of São Paulo’s Renda Mínima
programme, and other similar programmes in Brazil,
began in the early 1990s in response to São Paulo’s
Senator Suplicy’s Senate bill proposing a universal basic
or citizen income.10 The debate among well-placed
politicians and economists on what form such a
programme should take in Brazil, led to the first
municipal family income guarantee programmes in
1995. By the time a modified version of the Senate bill
was passed by Congress in 2004, over 100
municipalities had implemented such programmes and
the federal government had adopted Bolsa Família.11
São Paulo’s Renda Mínima nicely illustrates the
centrality of political leadership, and the role of
electoral cycles. The programme was only created in
2001 because both the PT and PSDB lost mayoral
elections to a conservative political machine, the
Partido Popular, in 1992 and 1996. Notwithstanding
defeat in the first of these mayoral elections, the PT
in 1995 did introduce a bill creating Renda Mínima in
the city’s Câmara dos Vereadores. Because of the
conservative mayor’s influence over the chamber, the
bill’s passage was uncertain and the PT orchestrated
a substantial civil society campaign. The campaign
included segments of the Catholic Church, the
bankers and chemical workers unions, and an array
of organisations with roots in the city’s poorer
communities and contributed to the passage of the bill. 
The 1995 campaign shows that it is possible to build
a coalition around broad entitlements for the poor
in São Paulo, but it may require strong political
leadership. The coalition disassembled after the bill’s
passage and was not reconstituted to meet
subsequent threats to the programme: the mayor’s
veto of the bill in 1995, for example, or the freeze on
its expansion placed by the PSDB-DEM
administration in the first two years in office. In
these and other cases, the political battles to
implement and expand the programme were fought
primarily by political leaders in and out of
government, rather than by leaders representing
networks of civil society organisations. 
5 Conclusion: extrapolating from the past
Civil society organisations that work with and
represent people living in poverty have had little say
in the design of Renda Mínima¸ and have only been
able to establish an ad hoc form of social
accountability, primarily through administrative
review procedures. Can we extrapolate from this
past that these actors’ relative silence will continue
into the future? Is there evidence that it is more
difficult for these organisations to engage with the
state around minimum income guarantee
programmes than it is around housing or health
programmes? That is, does the nature of the good
(individual) and/or of the institutional mechanism
through which it is delivered – direct income grants
to individual bank accounts – make it particularly
difficult for the poor to organise and build coalitions
that can influence policy? And, is a more systematic
form of social accountability of income guarantee
programmes therefore unrealistic? 
The original project hypothesis was that the income
grant or transfer programmes would contribute to
relatively silent relations between the state and
actors representing poor communities, because of
the nature of the good and the institutional mode of
delivery. Fieldwork in São Paulo, however, reveals
that, in the case of Renda Mínima, this silence was
manufactured politically, and reinforced by the
specific form the pro-SUAS movement has taken
and the extreme pluralisation of the organisations
working with people in poverty. It is not obvious that
political leaders, the pro-SUAS movement, or
another substantial actor, such as the Catholic
Church, would have more difficulty establishing a
broad coalition to negotiate Renda Mínima policy, or
to engage in social accountability of the programme,
than for other public policies.
Local leaders claim that, among people in poverty, it
is easier to mobilise around demands related to the
income guarantee programme than around demands
for urban infrastructure or public service. The
difficulty, they suggest, is forging alliances across
regions of the city, and with other (more influential)
actors, such as the pro-SUAS movement. The
question that needs to be answered now is: Are
these the inherent difficulties the poor face in
building alliances around public policies, or are these
difficulties particularly severe in the case of income
guarantee programmes? If the former is true, it is
possible that a key to building a pro-Renda Mínima
(or broader income guarantee) alliance is time – the
relative youth of the programme means that local
and city-level leaders have had only a few years to
learn about the programme’s scale and importance,
and to adjust their goals and strategies accordingly.
The answer, I expect, will emerge from the fieldwork
in the coming months.
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Exchange rate (late 2007) ¤1=R$2.70.
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monthly income transfer, but it is to be
implemented gradually according to the country’s
development and budgetary possibilities (Suplicy
2007: 2).
8 The programmes included smaller income
transfers for other age groups and three
‘emancipatory’ programmes that provided skills,
resources, and other support to income
generation initiatives.
9 The proposed structure was similar to the Unified
Health System (known as SUS) that public health
professionals – the Sanitaristas – played a key role
in developing in the 1980s (Dowbor, this IDS
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guarantee programmes. Bolsa Família was created
in 2003.
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